ClarisWorks, OLE vs. OpenDoc, and Microsoft

An online history of ClarisWorks contains the following passage:

Before ClarisWorks 5.0 was finished, the rift between Claris and the remaining development team grew too wide. Scott Holdaway, Tom Hoke, Scott Lindsey, Bruce Hammond, and Carl Grice left Claris, and formed what would later become Gobe Software. These were the core engineers, the ones who had been on the project the longest. Several newer engineers remained. Three in particular were responsible for OpenDoc integration. At Apple WWDC '96, they demoed a version of ClarisWorks with OpenDoc support. Apple was particularly eager to demonstrate to developers that a flagship product was supporting the new component technology - ergo, everyone else should too. Not surprisingly (to me, anyway), the following week the three engineers were recruited by Microsoft. Result: no OpenDoc support in ClarisWorks 5.0. That maneuver is just one typical example of the way Microsoft stifles competition [emphasis added]. Ironically, in this case it hit a product conceived in defiance of the Microsoft way.

This is a complete mis-characterization of Microsoft’s role.

With Windows sales booming in 1992-1993, Claris’ customers – who had previously used only Apple’s Macintosh computers – had acquired Windows-based computers too. They needed versions of Claris’ applications that ran on both Mac and Windows. These customers made it clear that if they didn’t get cross-platform versions of Claris’ applications soon, they would have to switch to some other company’s products. This put Claris’ management under the gun to get Windows versions of Claris’ applications onto the market ASAP. Producing Windows software was major change for Claris, because it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Apple Computer, which made the Macintosh, which competed against Microsoft’s Windows.

As Microsoft’s Technology Evangelist to Claris, I facilitated Claris’ exploration of Windows’ technologies. I worked mostly with Larry Slotnick, Claris’ VP of Product Development, and Don Bradford, Claris’ Senior Director of Integrated Product Development.

As I understand it, Don hired outside contractors to implement two different test versions of ClarisWorks, one using OpenDoc (backed by Apple, Novell, and IBM)and one using OLE (backed by Microsoft). Based on the results of this experiment, Don concluded that OpenDoc objects were too slow and heavy to meet ClarisWorks’ need for a fast, lightweight, cross-platform object model. Don and Larry decided that ClarisWorks 4.0 would use OLE instead of OpenDoc (as would FileMaker, BTW).

When informed of this technical decision, Apple’s management was furious, insisting that ClarisWorks WOULD support OpenDoc, emphasizing that “we OWN you, and you WILL do as you’re told,” with the clear implication that any Claris employee who persisted in championing OLE would be fired, irrespective of the prevailing technological realities.

In response to Apple’s threat, the entire ClarisWorks team had an all-day off-site meeting (at Vancouver’s Red Lion Inn at the Quay) to discuss its options. At the end of the meeting, Don called me at my office in Redmond, with his entire team participating by speakerphone.

As I recall, the conversation went something like this:

DON: James, I’ve got the whole ClarisWorks team together here, and we’ve been talking all day about Apple’s decision to ram OpenDoc down our throats.

TEAM: [boos, hisses, etc.]

DON: We’ve decided – and we’re all amazed at this decision…

TEAM: [laughter]

DON: …we’ve decided that we all want to join Microsoft as a team.

JAMES: [pause] Excuse me?

TEAM: [laughter]

DON: Microsoft is the only company that’s big enough to keep our whole team together so we want to join Microsoft, don’t we, guys?

TEAM: [cheers, laughter]

JAMES: Cool! I’ll see what I can do.

I called a senior staffer in Microsoft’s HR group (I don’t remember who) and suggested that she send a recruiter right away to hire the entire ClarisWorks team. She nearly had a coronary! She explained that because Microsoft had a competing product (Microsoft Works), hiring the ClarisWorks team would be seen as “predatory hiring” – a violation of anti-trust rules – despite the team’s “invitation to hire” (which I would have thought to be a water-tight defense). However, if INDIVIDUAL Claris employees wanted to explore career opportunities at Microsoft, then…fine. So Microsoft ended up cherry-picking the best people out of the ClarisWorks team.

Microsoft’s first hire was Don, who formed Microsoft’s new Macintosh Internet Team in Silicon Valley, into which he hired many other Claris folks. His team went on to produce Internet Explorer 2.1 for the Mac, which won every comparative review and was subsequently licensed by Apple as its default browser.

Within months, Apple realized that Don and Larry had been right – that is, that OLE really was the only viable technology for ClarisWorks 4.0 – and aligned its development efforts accordingly. After much delay, it released ClarisWorks 4.0 in late 1994 with extensive OLE support.

About the same time, Novell released PerfectOffice 3.0, also with extensive OLE support. The release of these OLE-supporting products from two of OpenDoc’s leading backers told the whole world that OpenDoc was dead, and it happened in late 1994. By the time Microsoft hired Claris’ last three OpenDoc-savvy engineers – in 1996, according to the above – OpenDoc was already deader than Babbage’s Difference Engine.

In summary, the ClarisWorks story is not, in any way, “an example of the way Microsoft stifles competition.” It is, instead, a story of Apple’s early-1990’s management being critically out of touch with technological reality. Claris’ technologists tried to speak truth to power, but those in power at Apple refused to listen until it was too late. All Microsoft did was provide a better technology option, and pick up the pieces when Apple shattered its own ClarisWorks team.